It appears as if the problem is, you do not want to accept the ramifications of the courts opinion as written, and instead you choose to misuse it in a manner that suits your needs. You can not do that, well you can, but you will lose every time. For the record, I quoted the entire section from the court’s opinion that addressed the 2001 crop issue – I edited out nothing, leaving it in context.
Let me break this down to a bulleted lists for you, the court cites case law that relates to the issue by citing:
In re Marriage of Heinze, 257 Ill. App. 3d 782, 785 (1994)
Future income is a marital asset where the income derives from efforts or products produced during the marriage.
In re Marriage of Mohr, 260 Ill. App. 3d 98, 103 (1994)
- Crops grown even on nonmarital property can be considered in determining marital income and marital property.
- Farm income derives from the sale of crops, and the labor may precede the income by many months.
- In farming, the income-the yield and the price-is uncertain and beyond control.
Remember this is the appellate court and they are reviewing the decision of the trial court based on claims from Alisha that the lower court erred in some of its decisions. One of those claims is that the court erred in its decisions about the, as yet realized income from the 2001 crops. We also know from the opinion that the appeals court is of the opinion that Alisha over valued the crop and held no interest in it.
You ask, “How then did the court's decision conflict with the earlier statement? ‘Future income is a marital asset where the income derives from efforts or products produced during the marriage.’”
I did not say there was a conflict. Have you read
In re Marriage of Heinze, 257 Ill. App. 3d 782, 785 (1994)? In this case the issue were the royalties from four books written by the wife during the marriage. The books had been written, published, and sales begun (meaning royalties were gained) during the marriage and thus future royalties were easily established. You have no proof that the book you hold in question was anything more than an idea during the marriage. Even the document mentioning it merely states there will be a book in the future dealing with the Sabbath and it will be written by Danny and Shelly. For all intents and purposes the book could merely have been a comment at that time, with not one word put to page. In
Heinze, the books were written, contracts signed, and books on the shelf. The cases cited in
Heinze have similar fact scenarios to
Heinze, and are not similar to the Shelton situation.
In the
Heinze decision, the court cites Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1160. The courts opinion reads in relevant part:
In Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas (1985), 395 Mass. 704, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1160,
the court found that the trial court was warranted in failing to place a value on the
husband's patents on artificial skin designed for the treatment of severe burn
victims. The Yannas court determined that the trial court could have properly
concluded that the value of the future income from this source was too speculative
to consider. Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 481 N.E.2d at 1160.
Here, we conclude that, unlike the situation in Yannas, the trial court erred when it concluded that the petitioner's future book royalties were too speculative and unproven so that valuation was impossible. In the instant case, the petitioner received substantial book royalties during the marriage from 1984 up to the time of trial. As a result of the income received during the marriage, we do not believe the prospect of future book royalties is either unproven or speculative. Accordingly, we conclude that the future book royalties should have been classified as marital property and allocated between the parties.
The
Yannas case has relevance to
In re: Marriage of Bowlby and the Shelton’s case. The price of the crops was a speculative element, and therefore the trial court did not consider it in the marital settlement. The appellate court essentially affirmed this thinking, in
Bowlby, then went a step further arguing that because Matthew was given all the debt incurred in the raising and harvesting of the crop, he should reasonably receive the income generated by that crop. The court then modified the trial courts decision and gave Matthew the income from the crop. An interesting side note: In this case,
Bowlby, there is an ex-wife who, by the courts admission, was left in a financially positive reality by the marital settlement, while the husband was left with a negative one. Yet, she appealed the court’s decision, demanding more.
The
Heinze court in its opinion cited
Dunn v. Dunn, (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 802 P.2d 1314, 1319, as it discussed the future book royalties in question. In
Dunn it was stated that future royalties, from the invention and manufacture of a surgical instrument during the marriage, was indeed marital property. In both
Dunn and
Heinze what is being dealt with is a known quantity. In the case of
Heinze, there were already contracts regulating the four books – before – the disillusionment of the marriage. The
Heinze court goes back to Dunn as it discusses the allocation of future royalties:
“In making this allocation, we find the case of Dunn v. Dunn instructive. The court in Dunn noted that the husband spent time traveling to demonstrate the surgical instrument he invented. The court held that his wife was entitled to one-half of the royalties received from the invention, less an appropriate deduction for the time her husband spent generating the royalty income. Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1319.
We also note that section 503 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 503) does not require an equal distribution of marital property. ( In re Marriage of Aschwanden (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 31, 37, 411 N.E.2d 238, 241, 44 Ill. Dec. 269.) Rather, this section provides that marital property should be divided in "just proportions." Aschwanden, 82 Ill. 2d at 37, 411 N.E.2d at 241.
(B)ased upon the reasoning in Dunn, we find that the petitioner's efforts entitle her to a larger share of the royalties.
We note the respondent conceded in his reply brief that the petitioner's efforts could be considered by this court in dividing the book royalties. Respondent suggested a 60% to 40% division of the royalties. We find the respondent's proposed division would not give the petitioner an adequate share of the royalties based upon her time-consuming and continuing efforts to promote sales of the four books. We conclude that a 75% to 25% division is not a great departure from the division proposed by the respondent and would be more appropriate based upon the unusual facts of this case.
[A]ccordingly, we conclude that it would be inequitable to require the petitioner to bear these tax consequences without imposing an offset upon the respondent's award of 25% of the book royalties. Consequently, the computation of the respondent's 25% of the book royalties shall be made in the following manner: (1) the petitioner shall compute the amount of each royalty payment from Lingui which is attributable to sales of the four books written during the marriage (gross royalties); (2) the petitioner shall determine her liability for federal and state income taxes on the gross royalties based upon her applicable tax bracket; (3) the petitioner's income tax liability shall then be deducted from the gross royalties, thereby creating an amount which we will refer to as the net royalties; and (4) the petitioner shall pay the respondent 25% of the net royalties from the four books.
The above is mentioned to provide definitive context that what is being discussed by the court is product that was created while the marriage existed. Additionally, the royalties or profits from that product were already coming in before the dissolution of the marriage. The fact scenario is nothing like
Bowlby or the Shelton proceedings.
The fact that the
Bowlby court cited the line from
Heinze does not establish law that says, “In all cases anything created during a marriage that leads to financial gain is marital property.” A nascent idea does not constitute marital property. Nor does, the
Bowlby decision, indicate that all financial gain resulting after the dissolution of the marriage, but arising from product created during the marriage, is viable consideration as marital property.
Since you have no proof of the books date of creation you must be relying on the idea that it is the mere thought or mention of a book that brings it into existence. Your ill conceived logic appears to suggest that any thought, idea, or inspiration, a spouse has while married becomes marital property. If one were to apply this idea further, they might have a strong argument that Linda had no interest of any kind in 3ABN since the dream, idea, or thought, existed in Danny’s mind prior to their marriage (
A Channel of Blessing by Bob Ellis, pg 24, in talking about the inspiration for 3ABN, “His first thought the night before (at 3:00 AM, actually) had been to telephone his best friend and soon to be wife, his beloved Linda.”). However, this theory could never survive a day in court. You have no proof the book existed as anything more than a mere mention in the September 2004 issue of
3ABN World. Because of this, any future royalties would reasonably be considered speculative, as there wasn’t even a guarantee the book would be written. Your speculation that the mention, in September of 2004, of a future book then logically assumes its existence prior to June 25 of the same year is inane.
You have taken a quote you like, one which on its face may appear to serve your purpose, and attempted to shove this square peg into a legal round hole. The courts citation of the comment in
Heinze is used to establish some legal history or precedence, but the court then indicates, it does not apply in this situation and provides its rationale for making that decision. You have completely ignored the facts and misappropriated the courts use of the quote. In analyzing
Heinze it becomes even more obvious that what the law has addressed is the creation of product during a marriage and the on-going royalties or financial gain from that product of the marriage relationship. Even if you had some legal ground to stand on, it is evident that the
Dunn case would significantly reduce any financial gain that Linda might realize – remembering that it is unlikely she has any standing to make a claim.
Back to the
Bowlby decision, it appears you missed the following commentary:
- “Alisha argues that the trial court abused its discretion because its division of marital assets was unjust . . . We disagree.”
- “A trial court's distribution of marital assets should not be reversed absent an abuse of the trial court's discretion . . . In re: Marriage of Schmidt, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 966."
- "Just proportions does not mean equal amounts, and the trial court is not obligated to make specific findings as the reasons for its award. In re: Marriage of Schmidt, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 966."
- "Even if we were to accept Alisha's asserted personal debts . . . the trial court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the marital property, and Alisha's arguments are unavailing. The trial court's award was in "just proportions." See 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000)."
- “The value of the growing crops is speculative, . . .”
- “After Matthew is awarded the entirety of the 2001 growing crop, the distribution remains equitable in nature and in just proportions.”
The thinking evident here, in the courts own words, establishes the rationale whereby it shows how the comment you have cherry-picked from the
Heinze case, does not apply. The application of this thinking to the Shelton case would likely result in a decision that, since the work did not exist in any form, other than thought, speculation, or conversation prior to the dissolution of the Shelton’s marriage it is not marital property. Because it is not marital property, Linda Shelton has no claim to royalties on the book in question. Even if the book was outlined on paper prior to the marriage, all value would be speculative and therefore not to be considered in the settlement of marital property.